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David J. Garrow* 
Professor Burk, in publishing a revision of his doctoral disser-
tation at the University of Wisconsin, says his book is "an account 
of the racial policies of the Eisenhower administration and an effort 
to explain why particular approaches were adopted by the executive 
branch in the 1950s and others were not."' At that rather modest 
level, Burk's volume is an adequate and workmanlike discussion of 
a half-dozen different policy subjects-desegregation of the armed 
services, racial issues in the federally-controlled District of Colum-
bia, integration of the federal work force, equal employment rules 
for federal contractors, and discrimination in federally-assisted 
housing-plus a recounting of the Eisenhower administration's ma-
jor civil rights events: the Brown decisions, the Little Rock crisis, 
and the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. However, it is not 
thoroughly researched, nor a notable improvement over previous 
scholarly surveys of civil rights developments of the 1950's. Besides 
offering a critique of the Burk book, this essay will explore how 
some newly released documents shed light on the political relation-
ship between black America and the Eisenhower administration, 
and particularly on some unusual financial arrangements involving 
the White House and Adam Clayton Powell. 
I 
Burk devotes only a modest effort to providing any analytical 
or thematic overviews of the Eisenhower administration's civil 
rights policies. When he does voice such conclusions, however, 
they are well-supported and accurate. He correctly identifies "a 
consistent pattern of hesitancy and extreme political caution in de-
fending black legal rights" by Eisenhower's executive branch, and 
notes that "[m]uch of the blame for the administration's excessive 
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caution lay squarely with the President himself."2 Burk gives two 
major reasons for that stance. Most important was Eisenhower's 
own conservative racial attitude; as Burk points out, yet fails to em-
phasize fully enough, "Eisenhower publicly waffled on the basic is-
sue of the morality of segregation."3 Second, there was 
Eisenhower's "strong aversion to the use of federal power as a coer-
cive instrument" generally.4 In combination, Burk says, these two 
significant influences left Eisenhower and his administration "inca-
pable of moving beyond symbolism to an open confrontation with 
racial inequalities. "s 
The "symbolic" nature of the Eisenhower administration's few 
racial initiatives is a point that Burk makes repeatedly, but with 
only a pro forma citation of some of the traditional works on "sym-
bolic politics." In that standard usage, a political actor employing 
"symbolic" conduct is seeking to convey the appearance of action, 
so as to reassure some constituency, rather than pursue any truly 
substantive policy. To say that the Eisenhower administration's ra-
cial policies were largely symbolic in this sense would be fully con-
sistent with the historical record that Burk recounts. Burk also 
seems, however, to have another and much more original idea of 
symbolism. In his concluding paragraph, Burk suggests for the first 
time the idea that the long-term effect of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration's passivity on civil rights was to strengthen Americans' sup-
posedly prevailing assumption that the pursuit of racial equality 
would be relatively painless. That implicit reassurance, Burk seems 
to say, was the worst possible preparation for America's racial fu-
ture. The 1960's brought home to all the fact that racial change 
would be far more problematic and painful than most Eisenhower 
administration policymakers supposedly assumed in the mid-
1950's.6 
Burk would have been well-advised to devote far more atten-
tion to fleshing out the idea that the Eisenhower administration did 
a very serious disservice to the subsequent course of American race 
2. Id. at 263. 
3. Id. at 193. 
4. Id. at 16. 
5. ld. at 127. 
6. !d. at 266. Burk seems to believe, as he indicates several times, that Eisenhower and 
those around him believed in "the idea of an affluent, color-blind, democratic society" and 
assumed that it could be achieved without federal intervention. ld. at 127. Burk is on firmer 
ground, however, when he describes how Eisenhower and several top aides and close friends 
vocally opposed some forms of racial equality and harbored clearly racist thoughts. 
Although Burk is likely off·target in attributing any clearly thought-out egalitarian or even 
"color blind" ideals to either Eisenhower or most of his top aides, that point is neither neces-
sary nor essential to his nascent argument about the longer-term effects of the administra-
tion's racial stance. 
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relations. From events large and small-particularly the adminis-
tration's very grudging role in Brown I and its hesitant, tardy inter-
vention in Little Rock-one could build a powerful argument that 
the administration's conduct gave important indirect assistance to 
the segregationist backlash that emerged as so powerful a political 
force across the South between 1955 and 1959. This point has often 
been made about President Eisenhower's equivocal remarks about 
Brown, but Burk could well have applied the point far more 
broadly. Similarly, he also could have expanded considerably, and 
interwoven with that theme, his description of the administration's 
indecisive support of what appeared to be the most politically un-
controversial civil rights initiatives, defense of the right to vote. As 
Burk notes, administration advocacy of voting rights statutes and 
support for a relatively powerless Commission on Civil Rights al-
lowed Eisenhower to convey the appearance of taking meaningful 
civil rights initiatives while his administration's actual priority was 
to avoid civil rights involvement as much as possible and keep racial 
matters on the back burner for the indefinite future. Essentially the 
same strategy was pursued by the Kennedy administration until 
events in the late spring of 1963 forced it to change course. 
Burk unfortunately does not consider such broader themes. 
He ends his brief, concluding description of the largely "symbolic" 
nature of Eisenhower administration policies by suggesting that 
they postponed and misled America about the inevitably traumatic 
racial changes that lay ahead, and in so doing helped produce a 
"bitter harvest of hypocritical national self-deception."7 He treats 
this point so tersely, however, that even the careful reader has to 
work hard to extract Burk's likely meaning. 
Burk is to be commended for adopting a clearly and deservedly 
critical attitude towards Eisenhower's racial policies, especially at a 
time when most recent scholarship on the Eisenhower administra-
tion is turning strongly commendatory and even some apologies for 
its civil rights conduct are being authored.s Another important 
theme, which Burk alludes to only in passing, would be a direct 
treatment of how that executive branch abdication of racial respon-
sibility contributed so heavily to passing the initiative to the judici-
ary, particularly the Fifth Circuit. 
If Burk does an adequate though unprovocative job of docu-
7. !d. at 266. 
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menting executive branch civil rights actions under Eisenhower, he 
does not even begin to describe the administration's dealings with 
black political and civil rights activists. He seems relatively unfa-
miliar with the original sources that could have given him a much 
richer understanding of the black political scene in the 1950's. A 
full understanding of administration policy cannot be achieved 
without a well-versed appreciation of the larger political context. In 
particular, Burk seems relatively unfamiliar with the importance of 
the major strategic concern that privately divided America's black 
leadership in the late 1950's, the question of whether civil rights 
proponents should continue to depend upon the lawyer-led litiga-
tion approach that had produced Brown, or whether mass boycotts 
and demonstrations could play an equal role in advancing black 
freedom. While the Brown triumph had pointed most strategically 
minded activists in the first direction, the remarkable success of the 
mass-based Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott of 1955-56 gave 
great heart to those activists, particularly long-time Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters President A. Philip Randolph, who believed 
that the black masses, acting for themselves, could do as much as 
the courtroom efforts of a lawyerly elite. 
Burk's relative blindness to important political themes such as 
this stems largely from his failure to draw on the archival papers of 
the major black groups of that time. Nor did he consult the major 
black newspapers and periodicals-Jet magazine, the New Y ark 
Amsterdam News, the Pittsburgh Courier-that are truly invaluable 
sources for understanding the black political world of the 1950's. 
Although his bibliographical essay makes passing reference to the 
value of both types of sources,9 the book reflects no actual use of 
them. Burk also did not interview any sources, nor did he appar-
ently make much use of the Freedom of Information Act to obtain 
unreleased federal documents dealing with civil rights in the 1950's. 
Use of these sources would have helped produce a far richer and 
more original book. 
Burk's research shortcomings contribute substantially to his 
less than adequate treatment of the major black political initiatives 
of the late 1950's. He devotes hardly a paragraph to the important 
1957 Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, 10 organized originally to put 
pressure on Eisenhower to speak out against southern segregationist 
attacks upon black activists; gives only a few sentences to the sole 
meeting, in June 1958, that the black leadership had with the Presi-
9. R. BuRK, supra note 1, at 270. 
10. /d. at 220; Martin Luther King, Jr., eta!. to Dwight D. Eisenhower (Feb. 14, 1957, 
GF 124-A-1, Box 912, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS) [hereinafter DDEL]. 
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dent; and hardly mentions two significant but often-ignored na-
tional demonstrations in the nation's capital, the 1958 and 1959 
Youth Marches for Integrated Schools. 11 These inadequacies not 
only lead to a seriously deficient portrayal of the political pressure 
that black leaders were attempting to place on the administration, 
but also lead Burk to understate the concern that often existed 
within the Eisenhower White House about the danger of public 
political embarrassment to the President by the black leadership, 
and the strategies for minimizing that danger adopted by Eisen-
hower's aides. 
By early 1957 a number of significant black leaders, including 
A. Philip Randolph, NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins, 
New York Democratic Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, and 
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Montgomery 
Improvement Association, which had sustained the famous boycott 
of that city's municipal buses, all were becoming concerned about 
the administration's attitude toward the black leadership. Despite 
four years in office and a landslide 1956 reelection victory that had 
included substantial black support,l2 President Eisenhower had yet 
to meet with any significant group of America's black leaders. That 
failure, coupled with a strong upsurge in white terrorist violence in 
Alabama in late 1956 and early 1957, led King and several dozen 
other Southern activists, who were just beginning to form the or-
ganization that soon was named the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, to use their first organizing session to formulate three 
requests to the administration: that Eisenhower advocate peaceful 
compliance with Brown, that Vice President Richard M. Nixon 
come south to look into violence against blacks, and that Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell meet with black activists to discuss fed-
eral protection for civil rights activists. White House Chief of Staff 
Sherman Adams brushed aside the first two requests, and Brownell 
declined the third. Those rebuffs led King and his colleagues to 
repeat the demands a month later, and to announce that they would 
lead "a pilgrimage of prayer to Washington" if the administration 
continued to refuse their requests.B 
The Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, as the demonstration 
came to be called, was scheduled for May 17, 1957, the third anni-
versary of Brown I. It drew the active support of Randolph, Wil-
kins, King's southern network, and a variety of black churchmen. 
II. R. BURK, supra note I, at 83, 238. 
12. /d. at 170. 
13. King to Eisenhower (Jan. II, 1957), Sherman Adams to King (Jan. 18, 1957), and 
King et al. to Eisenhower (Feb. 14, 1957, GF-124-A-1, Box 912, DDEL). 
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The protest was the most significant political initiative undertaken 
by national black leaders since Randolph's 1941 threat of a march 
on Washington had led President Roosevelt to issue an Executive 
order banning racial discrimination by federal military contractors. 
The 1957 Pilgrimage was a direct outgrowth of the black leader-
ship's dismay that the Eisenhower administration had little interest 
in either the growing turmoil in the South or the thoughts of black 
leaders. 
The announcement of the Pilgrimage, and particularly the pos-
sibility that it would become an anti-Eisenhower demonstration, 
created considerable concern within the White House. Burk's rela-
tive inattention to the network of contacts that did exist between the 
Eisenhower White House and certain black leaders leads him to un-
derplay the administration's sagacious and sophisticated response to 
the challenge that the Pilgrimage represented. 
Burk does provide an excellent sketch of the valuable but often 
awkward role played by the Eisenhower White House's single black 
professional staff member, E. Frederic Morrow. Openly snubbed by 
some White House colleagues, Morrow had to cope with numerous 
black entreaties while often encountering substantial difficulties in 
getting his opinions taken seriously by higher-ranking staffers. 
Burk's sensitive portrait of Morrow is one of the strongest sections 
of his book.'4 Disappointingly, he does not show similar interest in 
other important black figures such as Republican National Com-
mittee staffer Val Washington and Archibald J. Carey, an early ap-
pointee to the President's Committee on Government Employment 
Policy. More importantly, Burk also gives insufficient attention to 
the very important role played by Maxwell M. Rabb, the racially 
liberal White House aide who, rather than Morrow, had primary 
responsibility for administration liaison with black organizations. 
II 
Perhaps the major reason for Burk's inadequate treatment is 
his general overreliance on secondary sources and insufficient min-
ing of the rich original sources available at the Eisenhower Library. 
While Burk at times has made adequate usage of those materials, in 
many instances he has not; his second chapter, for instance, on the 
desegregation of the armed services, contains not one citation to 
unpublished sources. 
This deficient utilization of the available original sources re-
sults in some substantial holes, none larger than Burk's failure to 
14. R. BuRK, supra note I, at 77-88. 
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explore the fascinating relationship between the Eisenhower White 
House, particularly Max Rabb, and New York Democratic Repre-
sentative Adam Clayton Powell. Burk notes almost casually, in his 
sole paragraph on the 1957 Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, that 
Powell had served as a White House "mole" within the black lead-
ership during the time that the Pilgrimage was being organized.Is 
Rather amazingly, Burk cites no original sources for this point; his 
only reference is an excellent book by Herbert Parmet which turns 
out to contain a considerably more extensive account of the Powell-
Eisenhower White House relationship.I6 Surprisingly, Burk did not 
pursue this lead to see whether there were more revealing original 
sources unavailable to Parmet. If he had, Burk would have discov-
ered that there are such items, and that the further leads they pro-
vide are most intriguing indeed. 
Early in the Eisenhower administration, Powell had been a vo-
cal public critic of the executive branch's lackluster efforts to elimi-
nate racial discrimination in the armed services and in public 
schools housed on military bases. Rabb had taken the lead in as-
suaging Powell's anger and, thanks to his adept handling of the 
Congressman, Powell soon was publicly praising the administra-
tion's swift response to his complaints.11 
Building on that success, Rabb proceeded to ingratiate himself 
with Powell in a fashion that repeatedly proved invaluable to the 
Eisenhower White House. Rabb, whom Morrow later character-
ized as "a very suave, smooth, able man" who "can really butter 
people up,"1s skillfully commended Powell's various recommenda-
tions and suggestions in a warm series of personal letters that fea-
tured "Dear Adam" and "My dear Max" salutations.I9 Rabb 
proudly sent news clippings reporting Powell's public pro-Eisen-
hower comments to White House chief of staff Sherman Adams, 
noting how "a little friendly treatment" had paid off.2o By the fall 
of 1956, with Eisenhower's reelection prospects looking quite rosy, 
the Harlem Democrat publicly endorsed the Republican President's 
15. /d. at 220. 
16. H. PARMET, EISENHOWER AND THE AMERICAN CRUSADES 505-08 (1972). 
17. Powell to Eisenhower (June 3, 1953), Eisenhower to Powell (June 6, 1953), and 
Powell to Eisenhower (June 10, 1953, OF 142-A-4, Box 731, DDEL); R. BURK, supra note I, 
at 29-31, 35-37, 39-40; M. Mayer, supra note 8, at 42, 47-49. 
18. E. Frederic Morrow Interview with Thomas Soapes (Feb. 23, 1977, transcript p. 8, 
DDEL). 
19. See Rabb to Powell (Sept. 18, 1953; Oct. 19, 1953; Sept. 2, 1954; and Dec. 9, 1954), 
Powell to Rabb (Dec. 10, 1954), Rabb to Powell (Feb. 3, 1955), Powell to Rabb (Feb. 4, 1955; 
Feb. 15, 1955; and Mar. 3, 1955), and Rabb to Powell (Mar. 17, 1955; June 2, 1955; June 21, 
1955; and Oct. 17, 1955) (Powell Alpha File, Box 2485, DDEL). 
20. Rabb to Adams (no date, attached to New York Herald Tribune clip, Oct. 12, 1953, 
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candidacy after a personal meeting at the White House.21 
The Republican courtship of Powell left him vulnerable to 
sharp criticism from civil rights proponents troubled by his enthusi-
asm for a President who was unwilling even to endorse the correct-
ness of Brown. But Powell was at least as much a self-promoter as a 
committed advocate for black freedom. Morrow accurately termed 
Powell "a flamboyant opportunist" in a confidential memo to Sher-
man Adams;22 other staffers, particularly Rabb, appreciated how 
friendly relations with Powell could be used to the administration's 
advantage when prominent black assistance was needed to deflect 
civil rights criticism. The Prayer Pilgrimage represented just such a 
situation where that carefully cultivated relationship could be use-
fully employed. 
Newly released documents also reveal some sub rosa financial 
relationships between Powell and the administration, stemming 
from the 1956 election campaign. In September 1957, more than 
ten months after the election, Powell asked Eisenhower's top White 
House staffers to provide at least several thousand dollars worth of 
funds to a number of Powell's political associates, funds that Powell 
asserted were needed to reimburse election expenses incurred on his 
behalf. "The leadership of the Republican party," Powell told 
White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams in a September 27 let-
ter, previously had promised to make good these sums, and Powell 
was now demanding immediate payment. When Powell's letter was 
forwarded to high-ranking presidential aides Bryce Harlow and 
Gerald Morgan, Harlow in puzzlement returned it to Adams. 
"Since, obviously, this letter concerns clandestine arrangements 
with which Mr. Morgan and I are unfamiliar," Harlow told Adams, 
"we are [at] a loss as to (1) what reply to make and (2) who should 
pay up."23 
Powell's particular demands ranged from the mundane to the 
most intriguing. He wanted $900 for two of his secretaries to whom 
he owed overtime, $200 for a researcher he had retained, and $600 
in personal reimbursement for funds he had advanced to another 
political aide. One other loose end concerned contacts Powell had 
made with black reporters. "Each one of the Negro newsmen in 
New York was promised one hundred dollars ($100)," Powell told 
Adams. "Each one received the money with the exception of James 
Booker of the New York Amsterdam News. In order to keep from 
21. R. BuRK, supra note I, at 168-69. 
22. Morrow to Adams (Feb. 27, 1956, OF 142-A, Box 731, DDEL). 
23. Powell to Adams (Sept. 27, 1957), and Harlow & Morgan to Adams (Oct. I, 1957) 
(Powell Alpha File, Box 2486, DDEL). 
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losing his friendship ... I paid that money to him by check. This 
money should immediately be paid to me. "24 
Impatient to obtain the funds, Powell wrote Adams a second 
letter, adding a more specific request that $495 immediately be sent 
to one particular individual whom Powell had discussed in a more 
general way in his first letter. Within a week's time, White House 
and Republican National Committee staffers arranged to satisfy 
Powell's demands. Adams's secretary informed him that "checks 
to all the people involved with Adam Clayton Powell will go for-
ward on November 15-these include those named in the second 
letter as well. "2s Apparently that resolved the matter to the full 
satisfaction of everyone concerned. 
Given the existence of such intimate ties, it should come as no 
surprise that Powell worked closely with the Eisenhower White 
House, and Rabb in particular, when the threat of the Prayer Pil-
grimage first loomed in the early spring of 1957. Powell informed 
his friend Rabb in advance about a major planning meeting that 
would take place on April 5, and volunteered to try and torpedo the 
entire Pilgrimage. "Powell is very much opposed to such a march 
and will do what he can to stop it," Rabb informed Chief of Staff 
Adams.26 Powell recommended that Rabb also consult with 
NAACP Washington representative Clarence Mitchell. The next 
day, forty-eight hours in advance of the session, Rabb gave Adams 
an update on the situation. 
Congressman Powell will attend the meeting and will report to me what takes place. 
He is still a little fearful that, despite Clarence Mitchell's representations, Martin 
Luther King may still try to make a march on Washington. Powell and Mitchell 
will do their best to try to keep the meeting under controJ.27 
In the wake of the meeting, Powell informed Rabb, who appar-
ently took Powell's remarks at face value, that he, Mitchell and a 
third like-minded attendee at the April 5 planning session had been 
able to transform the Pilgrimage from an anti-Eisenhower demon-
stration into a purely celebratory event. Powell and his allies, Rabb 
told Adams, "successfully changed the entire character of this 
meeting into an occasion where there will be an observance of the 
anniversary of the school decision through prayer," and no criti-
cisms of the administration. The fact that neither King nor any 
other major proponent of the Prayer Pilgrimage had pushed for any 
24. Powell to Adams (Sept. 27, 1957); "Memorandum" (Oct. 16, 1957) (Powell Alpha 
File, Box 2486, DDEL). 
25. Powell to Adams (Oct. 16, 1957), "Mary" [Burns] to "Governor" [Adams] (Oct. 
24, 1957) (Powell Alpha File, Box 2486, DDEL). 
26. Rabb to Adams (Apr. 2, 1957) (GF 124-A-1, Box 912, DDEL). 
27. Rabb to Adams (Apr. 3, 1957) (OF 142-A, Box 731, DDEL). 
370 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:361 
anti-Eisenhower themes was unknown to Rabb, who instead ac-
cepted Powell's exaggerated claim. Rabb assured Adams that, 
thanks to Powell, "this matter is well in hand," but promised to 
keep a close eye on matters up through the May 17 event. "[W]e 
must keep constant vigil," Rabb said. "There is always the possibil-
ity that a prayer pilgrimage cannot be kept under control, and I am 
in constant communication with the leaders to ensure keeping it in 
hand."2s 
Two days before the Pilgrimage, NAACP Executive Secretary 
Roy Wilkins phoned Rabb "to assure [him] that there would be no 
demonstration against the Administration."29 On May 17, Pilgrim-
age organizers were disappointed when the crowd that gathered 
amounted to only a third of the 50,000 to 75,000 turnout they opti-
mistically had predicted. Speaking from the steps of the Lincoln 
Memorial, the march leaders focused their remarks on the need for 
further federal action to advance black civil rights, rather than on 
merely celebrating the third anniversary of Brown. In the first truly 
national speech of his young career, Martin Luther King, Jr., em-
phasized the importance of voting rights in the South, and called for 
federal government action to "[g]ive us the ballot." King's oration 
notwithstanding, press coverage of the Pilgrimage turned out to be 
disappointingly modest.Jo 
Although the Eisenhower White House was pleased with the 
Pilgrimage's moderate tone and modest public visibility, the black 
leadership remained angry at the President's refusal to meet with 
them. Vice President Nixon, after a personal conversation with 
King during the early March independence ceremonies for the new 
nation of Ghana, had promised to receive King in Washington. In 
a letter to Eisenhower's appointments secretary at the time of the 
Pilgrimage, King emphasized that that commitment "can in no way 
substitute for the necessity of my talking directly with the head of 
our great government." A meeting with the President, King 
stressed, "would at least give persons of good will in general and 
Negro Americans in particular a feeling that the White House is 
listening to the problems which we confront."JI 
Eisenhower aides were willing only to inform King that the 
28. Rabb to Adams (Apr. 17, 1957) (GF 124-A-1, Box 912, DDEL). 
29. Rabb to Mr. [Jack] Toner (May 16, 1957) (GF 124-A-1, Box 912, DDEL). 
30. Negroes Hold Rally on Rights in Capital, New York Times, May 18, 1957, at 1, col. 
8; Prayer Pilgrimage to Washington, 12 EBONY, Aug. 1957, at 16-22; H. PARMET, supra note 
16, at 508. 
31. L. REDDICK, CRUSADER WITHOUT VIOLENCE 180-84 (1959); CHRISTIAN CEN-
TURY, Apr. 10, 1957, at 446-48; letter from King to Bernard Shanley (May 16, 1957) (King 
Papers, Special Collections Dept., Mugar Library, Boston Univ., Boston, MA, Drawer IX) 
[hereinafter MLK]. 
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President would at some future time see him and other black lead-
ers. Despite repeated urgings from Max Rabb and especially Fred 
Morrow that such an audience not be greatly delayed, other White 
House staffers postponed any firm decision. A concerned Morrow 
bravely voiced a frank description of the situation to White House 
Chief of Staff Adams. "I can state categorically that the rank and 
file of Negroes in the country feel that the President has deserted 
them."32 King and A. Philip Randolph each informed the White 
House of their willingness to be patient in waiting for a firm date to 
be chosen. The question dragged on through both the summer and 
fall without any resolution, despite a message from Vice President 
Nixon, following his own meeting with King, that the Montgomery 
minister was a most impressive man whom he believed the Presi-
dent would enjoy meeting.33 
In late January of 1958, more than a year after King had first 
requested that the President signal his support for civil rights, King 
turned to Adam Clayton Powell for help. In a telegram to Eisen-
hower, Powell indicated that the President's evasiveness over meet-
ing with the black leadership was beginning to make even him 
critical about the administration's indifferent attitude toward civil 
rights.34 Even that was insufficient to generate any immediate pro-
gress, and not until May, when King publicly released a telegram to 
the President expressing "shock and dismay" over a recent Eisen-
hower comment that the enforcement of the law should not be al-
lowed to create hardship, did the White House staff move into 
action. Presidential aide Rocco Siciliano, who had taken over the 
now-departed Max Rabb's minority liaison responsibilities, phoned 
King to promise that a meeting with Eisenhower would be speedily 
arranged. Following a preparatory conference on June 9 with 
Siciliano, Morrow, and Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Walsh, 
where King insisted that a broader black group than simply himself 
and Randolph would have to be invited, a June 23 presidential audi-
ence was scheduled for those two men plus Wilkins and National 
Urban League chief Lester B. Granger. Finally, after more than 
five years in the White House, Dwight D. Eisenhower personally 
met with a representative group of black American leaders.3s 
32. Rabb to Files (May 23, 1957) and Rabb to Shanley (May 23, 1957) (GF 124-A-1, 
Box 912); Morrow to Adams (June 4, 1957) (OF 142-A, Box 731, DDEL). 
33. Rabb to Adams (June 5, 1957) (OF 142-A, Box 731), Rabb "Memorandum" (June 
20, 1957) (GF 124-A-1, Box 912), Rabb to Adams (June 24, 1957) (OF 142-A, Box 731), 
"Memorandum" (June 25, 1957) (GF 124-A-1, Box 912, DDEL); Rabb to Morrow (July 13, 
1957) (E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Box 10, DDEL); Morrow to Adams (Sept. 12, 1957) and 
Rabb to Adams (Sept. 27, 1957) (OF 142-A, Box 731, DDEL). 
34. Powell to Eisenhower (Jan. 28, 1958) (Powell Alpha File, Box 2486, DDEL). 
35. King to Eisenhower and "Statement" (May 29, 1958) (MLK Drawer VI); Siciliano, 
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Professor Burk is badly remiss in not giving far more extensive 
attention to both Representative Powell's relationship with the Ei-
senhower White House and the administration's indecisive dealings 
with the national black leadership. Even that presidential meeting 
itself did little to improve those badly frayed relations. When the 
four black leaders forthrightly voiced both black Americans' un-
happiness at the administration's racial record plus specific calls for 
further action, including a White House conference on southern de-
segregation, Eisenhower brushed them off. "I don't propose to 
comment on these recommendations. I know you do not expect me 
to. But I will be glad to consider them. There may be some value 
to your idea of a conference. But I don't think anything much 
would really come of one."36 Given that sort of presidential re-
sponse, King and his colleagues were unsurprised when the White 
House staff over the ensuing several months turned a deaf ear to-
ward Randolph's repeated requests for administration sponsorship 
of such a conference.37 
Here again Burk errs badly in not giving greater attention to 
that presidential audience and its aftermath. He also all but ignores 
the double-barrelled response King and Randolph organized, 
namely the two Youth Marches for Integrated Schools, which took 
place in Washington on October 25, 1958 and April18, 1959. More 
emphasis on these significant events, which drew crowds of 10,000 
and 26,000, would again have drawn attention to the continuing 
unhappiness of black America towards the Eisenhower administra-
tion.Js It also would have provided at least some indication of the 
ongoing mixture of disinterest and disdain with which the White 
House greeted these initiatives. When delegates from the first 
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Youth March arrived at the White House gate to present copies of 
petitions calling for greater administration support for southern 
school desegregation, no official appeared to receive them. When, 
well in advance of the second march, A. Philip Randolph repeat-
edly requested that several students from it be allowed to call on the 
President, the White House responded by eventually providing only 
an audience with presidential counsel Gerald D. Morgan.J9 
All in all, Burk's inadequate attention to these important 
events and the larger story of the political interactions between 
America's principal black leaders and the Eisenhower White House 
underlines once again the narrowness of his book and the incom-
pleteness of his research. Although his volume will be a useful re-
source for anyone seeking an adequate narrative account of federal 
civil rights policy initiatives during the 1950's, it reflects insufficient 
interest in black America's political climate during those years and 
incomplete study of the original source materials. A fully 
researched, politically informative, and analytically insightful study 
of the interactions between black America and the Eisenhower ad-
ministration remains to be written. 
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